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Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
September 6, 2013
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy,
Terence Cuneo (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2012, 385pp., $65.00 (hbk), ISBN
9780199558957.
Reviewed by Kelly Sorensen, Ursinus College
Public reason liberalism -- the form of liberalism defended by Rawls, Larmore,
Audi, Gaus, Rorty, Nussbaum, and to some degree Habermas -- usually requires citizens to
publicly discuss and vote based on only those reasons that pass some sort of test that sifts away
religious and comprehensive non-religious reasons. In the public sphere, those with such views
are required by the role of citizenship to shape up or shut up -- "shape up" in the sense of
offering instead reasons that can or could be shared by all other citizens. Nicholas
Wolterstorff argues that public reason liberalism is a dead end, and defends instead what he takes
to be a more defensible form of liberalism ("equal political voice liberalism"). His book is fresh
and compelling, and an important contribution to political philosophy.
This is a collection of mostly new essays: nine appear for the first time. The remaining
six are lightly edited for coherence with the new material. Ten concern public reason liberalism.
The rest take up the nature of rights (extending the account that Wolterstorff has been developing
in his recent books Justice: Rights and Wrongs and Justice in Love), the nature and source of
citizens' political obligations to the state, and other issues in political philosophy.
What motivates public reason liberalism's restrictions on the reasons citizens can express and
vote on? One factor is fairness, a second pluralism, and a third a certain kind of realism about
pluralism's persistence. Rawls says that we can expect "a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines,
including both religious and nonreligious doctrines . . . as the natural outcome of the activities of
human reason under enduring free institutions". This pluralism is "not seen as a disaster"
(Political Liberalism (PL), xxiv), but it does raise concerns regarding a fourth factor, the stability
of a liberal polity over time. Public reason liberalism sees religious comprehensive views in
particular as "not admitting of compromise" and "expansionist" (Rawls), and even "conversationstopping" and "dangerous" (Rorty). Because of these factors, public reason liberalism says, when
it comes to publicly advocating for coercive legislation and voting, a citizen should restrict
herself to reasons that she believes all capable adult fellow citizens do endorse or would endorse
if they were (variously) better informed, more rational, drawing on a shared fund of premises
that are freestanding and neutral with respect to controversial elements of comprehensive views,
and so on.
Among Wolterstorff's arguments against public reason liberalism are the following. First, public
reason liberalism actually is not realistic enough. One's capable adult fellow citizens clearly do
not universally endorse the same reasons. So public reason liberalism has to idealize -- it has to
imagine what reasons capable adult fellow citizens would endorse if they met certain
hypothetical conditions, with the presumption that a consensus or convergence about these

reasons would emerge. The hypothetical conditions vary from one brand of public reason
liberalism to another. Suppose the conditions are full information and full rationality.
Realistically, why think public reason liberalism is in a position to confidently say what reasons
emerge from that idealization, and to say that there would be a consensus about them? Why think
disagreement about these reasons will disappear under idealization? We can ask the same of
Rawlsian idealization, which is laxer but still unrealistically strong: why think there would be
consensus about what processes -- processes of rationally arriving at a set of judgments -- are
themselves reasonable? So public reason liberalism is not realistic enough: we are stuck with
pluralism, and we cannot idealize our way out of it.
Second, public reason liberalism is paternalistic and patronizing, despite its lip service to respect.
Suppose Jones favors some policy on religious reasons that do not qualify as public reasons.
Smith, a fan of public reason liberalism, is stuck with telling Jones, "You shouldn't express your
reasons in public discussion, and you shouldn't vote on them. Here instead are the kinds of
reasons that count -- reasons you would endorse if you were not under-informed and rationally
impaired." Jones will of course find this condescending and patronizing. Even if Smith chooses
more diplomatic words, public reason liberalism still entails a paternalistic and patronizing view
of Jones. It's no surprise if Jones resents such an entailment about his reasons and whether he
should express them and vote on them, and that resentment is a problem for the stability that
Smith and public reason liberals ostensibly treasure.
A third argument from Wolterstorff is that public reason liberalism cannot consistently get what
it wants anyway. Suppose Jones has a religious conviction that he should base his political
views on his religious convictions. Jones listens to the arguments and objections of others with
different views, but is unconvinced. He is like a Kantian listening to consequentialist arguments:
he refuses to think that way. On the one hand, public reason liberals might seem to tell Jones to
refrain from public discussion and voting. But on the other hand, that is "not what they should
say, given their position as a whole" (100). Public reason liberalism gives citizens a prima
facie duty to restrict themselves to public reasons, but in Jones's case that duty is outweighed by
what he takes to be an "ultima facie" duty to appeal to his religious reasons. Public reason
liberals will have to accept that Jones should reject their "public reason imperative." So public
reason liberalism seems to leave Jones free to publicly debate and to vote based on his religious
convictions after all -- the very result that most public reason liberals were attempting to avoid!
So it is not possible for public reason liberals, on their own terms, to declare religious reasons
inappropriate for public political discourse. There is a tension internal to the theory here.
A related fourth argument concludes that public reason liberalism asks too much of some
religious believers. It entails that a piece of coercive legislation's legitimacy depends on Jones
having, or counterfactually having, reasons in favor of the legislation that are good and decisive
for Jones, the coerced subject. For at least some public reason liberals, it is not enough that
Jones knows of public reasons that support the same legislation as his religious reasons; rather,
the public reasons must be those on the basis of which Jones actually speaks and votes (36, 80,
and 282). But this asks too much, Wolterstorff says. It asks Jones to let non-religious reasons
trump his religious reasons when he speaks publicly and goes to the polls.

Fifth, public reason liberalism may caricature religious believers, insofar as it implies that
believers are unwilling to go beyond the claim that "God told me that it's wrong so it's wrong."
Interestingly, Wolterstorff turns here to qualitative empirical data. In the public discussion in
Oregon in the 1990s about a physician-assisted suicide initiative, a leading account reports no
such appeals by religious believers. Instead, public discussion in Oregon was characterized by a
plurality of more substantive and contentful religious reasons, and also importantly, a plurality of
secular reasons (not the supposed universal counterfactual shared premises that public reason
liberalism inevitably resorts to).
Sixth, public reason liberalism may also caricature other varieties of liberal democratic
engagement. Suppose we turn for a moment from policy deliberation and decision, the favored
turf of public reason liberalism, to real-world grassroots organizing. In Maywood, California,
city council members instituted an unusually onerous penalty for car drivers without a license:
$1200 and a 30-day impound for the car. Towing companies were large donors to the city
councilors' campaign funds. The law hit undocumented workers especially hard. Community
members and community organizers attempted to use reasons -- public reasons -- to persuade the
city council to change the law. That failed. Public reason liberalism seems stuck with the view
that people in Maywood at that point should have backed off and shut up. Instead, acting under a
plurality of reasons and emotions, including moral outrage, they ran a media campaign to call
attention to the city council's corruption, and they registered more voters, until finally the city
council members were voted out of office. Public reason liberalism is ill-equipped to theorize
about real, non-well-ordered societies like, usually, our own.
These are only brief samples of Wolterstorff's arguments. He offers more sophisticated and
detailed versions of these and other arguments when he engages with the specifics of individual
theories of Rawls, Rorty, Gaus, Audi, Habermas, and others.
Wolterstorff calls his alternative form of liberal democracy "equal political voice liberalism," and
he thinks it better accounts for the "governing idea" found in the longer historical tradition of
liberalism, before public reason liberalism seized the spotlight in recent decades. There are two
key aspects of equal political voice liberalism. First, citizens speak and vote within a
constitutional context -- a context of classic civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
religious exercise, and freedom of association. Certain fundamental changes in law are
appropriately "off the table" in this context of constitutional limits. Second, citizens are to speak
and vote with an equal political voice. Intimidation and bullying are out; but otherwise,
Wolterstorff's view puts no restrictions on the kinds of reasons to which citizens can appeal in
public discussion and voting. That's it: we talk, using whatever reasons we want, religious and
non-religious, comprehensive or otherwise, and then we vote. Anyone who wants to persuade
others will, as a practical matter, find herself quoting reasons that will appeal to her opponents;
but there is no requirement that she restrict herself to some special set of reasons. After the vote,
there will be winners and losers. The losers will experience the winners' legislation as coercive.
But to have expected otherwise is utopian. And Wolterstorff claims to have uncovered a variety
of ways that public reason liberalism leans toward the utopian, despite its putative acceptance of
pluralism, realism, and worries about stability.

As to the six issues above, Wolterstorff claims that equal political voice liberalism comes off
better. First, it makes no unrealistic claim that, counterfactually, citizens' views on legislation
would match some imagined consensus or convergence. Second, it is more respectful and less
patronizing to citizens, because it does not tell them that their own reasons
are epistemically inadequate. Third, it lets citizens speak and act on their own reasons without
internal tension in the theory; and fourth, it does not demand that alien reasons be substituted and
decisive. Fifth, the view does not caricature the reasons that people with comprehensive views
tend to offer. Sixth, it is not myopic about varieties of democratic engagement -- there is policy
deliberation and decision, but there is also broad-based organizing, movement organizing, and
protest. Equal political voice liberalism better accounts for what happened in Oregon and in
Maywood.
Wolterstorff's equal political voice liberalism does issue some "shape up" talk of its own. While
designed to make broader room for religious reasons in the public square, it is not compatible
with every religious perspective. Wolterstorff's liberalism does ask thinkers like Egyptian
scholar Sayyid Qutb to endorse the constitutional context of liberal democracy and its
commitment to not favoring any particular religious tradition. For Wolterstorff, "to affirm the
liberal democratic polity is to put the shape of our life together at the mercy of votes in which the
infidel has an equal voice with the believer" (295).
A mood of non-utopianism hangs over the book, but Wolterstorff is neither resigned nor
pessimistic. Unlike dour critics such as MacIntyre, he loves liberal democracy. He agrees with
public reason liberals that pluralism is ineradicable, but claims that there is more respect, more
stability, and more positive endorsement of the system, when citizens speak and vote with an
equal voice in a context of fundamental constitutional limits.
Equal political voice liberalism seems straightforward and simple, and it certainly has many
attractions. Wolterstorff not only puts public reason liberals on the hot seat, but also sketches an
alternative that captures important planks of the liberal democratic tradition. But consider a few
concerns.
First, equal political voice liberalism seems to assume that after discussing and voting and
grassroots organizing, there will be winners and losers, but that often enough the winners will be
losers on other matters and the losers will in turn be winners (294). I take it this claim is
supposed to address familiar concerns about stability. But it would be utopian to think that this
happens often enough. It is easy to imagine places where the losers are very often repeat losers,
because a majority persists there that sees little need to engage minority interlocutors. Depending
on the place, the repeat losers could either be secular minorities or religious minorities.
Wolterstorff will claim otherwise, but the best form of public reason liberalism might have more
resources to address this worry than equal political voice liberalism.
Second, the book does not make clear whether Wolterstorff would consider an issue like stateauthorized gay marriage to be part of the constitutional context, properly understood, and so part
of the basic civil liberties that are "off the table" for democratic alteration by vote, or instead to
be up for public discussion and a vote. From his discussion of the Oregon physician-assisted
suicide case, we might think Wolterstorff would go for the latter, but personal correspondence

indicates that he believes the former. In any case, even more specificity about what is off the
table and what is on would be good.
Third, maybe things are not so bleak for public reason liberals, if they up their game and amend
certain claims. Consider what we might call aspirational public reason liberalism. This theory is
"aspirational" in three distinct ways. First, aspirational public reason liberalism asks citizens to
aspire to offer reasons that are more general and broadly held than their own particular
comprehensive-view-based reasons. But unlike the forms of liberalism that Wolterstorff's first
argument addresses, it does not rely on the idea of a universal consensus or convergence about
public reasons. Second, aspirational public reason liberalism does not require or demand
that citizens restrict themselves to these more general public reasons, but it does ask them to
aspire to offer them. Citizens do nothing forbidden or wrongful if they articulate religious or
other comprehensive view reasons, but they fulfill the role of citizen well if they also offer more
general reasons -- reasons that speak to a broader swath of fellow citizens. A third aspiration
concerns the place of these more general reasons among the citizen's individual motives:
aspirational public reason liberalism says that these more general reasons need not be decisive
for the citizen when she speaks and votes. We might also add a Rawlsian scope restriction: these
aspirations apply to "most cases of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice"
(PL, xxi), not necessarily to all matters of public discussion.
I believe this form of public reason liberalism survives most of Wolterstorff's objections. It
leaves room for many of his key points, including realism about the nature of lived citizenship
and public activism, and also openness to religious comprehensive views as historically a fecund
source of generalizable moral insight. It preserves many of the attractions of public reason
liberalism as well, including an ideal of the role of citizen and the role's coercive power that
encourages robust respect for other members of the polity. Consider Rawls's claim that "Public
reason sees the office of citizen with its duty of civility as analogous to that of judgeship with its
duty of deciding cases" (PL, liii). The citizen who fulfills her office well will aspire to articulate
reasons that go beyond her personal reasons -- a good citizen will do this not, as Wolterstorff's
equal political voice liberalism says, on a mere practical and rhetorical basis; and a good citizen
will do this even when she is part of a repeat-winner majority, when on Wolterstorff's view there
is no practical reason for her to do so.[1] The judge/citizen analogy may not be as tight as Rawls
seems to think: the role of judge comes with heavy demands of neutrality, while citizens face
less onerous aspirations. In any case, it's worth noting, as Wolterstorff does, that in the 1995
introduction to the paperback edition of PL, Rawls does begin to soften. He says there that he
now believes that reasons based on comprehensive doctrines "may be introduced in public reason
at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political
conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are
introduced to support" (PL, xlix). This isn't yet aspirational public reason liberalism, but it begins
to point in that direction.
Whether or not public reason liberalism can be patched up in this or other
ways, Wolterstorff's essays certainly reveal important undigested entailments in the standard
view. This really is an excellent book.

Nearly half the book takes up other topics, and I regret that I have not managed to discuss them.
For instance, Wolterstorff's discussion of privacy rights is particularly important. Take the case
of J. Edgar Hoover's spying on Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoover secretly taped King's personal
conversations and sex life. Suppose for a moment that King never knew of the privacy invasions,
and so made no decisions in light them; suppose Hoover made the recordings for his own
prurient enjoyment. (In fact, the FBI did try to blackmail King with these materials, as
David Garrow's biography of King indicates. Wolterstorff notes this in one place (223), but not
in another (326).) Standard accounts usually try to explain rights violations in terms of
constriction of the rights holder's normative agency, or of his freedom of opinion and action. But
in the imagined case, King's normative agency was not so affected. Still, his rights clearly were
violated. Standard accounts of rights cannot adequately explain the wrongfulness of privacy
violation, or the depth of the wrongness of rape, and are accordingly deficient.
Another chapter concerns the nature and source of the political authority of the state -- the state's
authority to issue binding directives to its citizens. This issue, long a mainstay in political
philosophy, largely dropped out of discussion a few decades ago. Wolterstorff resurrects it and
offers an interesting new account.
Wolterstorff's prose and thinking are clear. The book would work well in an upper-level
undergraduate or graduate course on liberalism.[2]
[1]

In personal correspondence, Wolterstorff says that he does believe that citizens are under a
moral demand to engage others, although a failure to so engage is not a violation of the
governing idea of liberal democracy.

[2]

My thanks to Nick Wolterstorff and Apryl Martin for their feedback on an earlier version of
this review.
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